Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform by Sylvester Schieber & John B. Shoven
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security
Reform
Volume Author/Editor: John B. Shoven, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-75485-5
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/shov00-1
Publication Date: January 2000
Chapter Title: Administering a Cost-Effective National Program of Personal
Security Accounts
Chapter Author: Sylvester Schieber, John B. Shoven
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7468
Chapter pages in book: (p. 41 - 76)National Program of Personal 
Security Accounts 
Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shoven 
In the debate about social security reform, many people today are either 
advocating or considering options that would have individuals accumulate 
some of their retirement savings through personal accounts. Among the 
issues that repeatedly arise in the discussion of these reform options are 
the administrative feasibility and the cost of such an approach to social 
security reform. For example, the recently released report of the National 
Academy of Social Insurance on privatizing social security raises the issue 
directly. It notes that “Dallas Salisbury does not think than [sic] an indi- 
vidual account system for over 140 million workers, with less than an 18 to 
24 month lag in account recording, is feasible at acceptable administrative 
costs in the absence of new technological developments, including moving 
5.5 million small employers from paper filing to automated filing” (NASI 
1998, n. 21). In an analysis of the Chilean retirement system, Peter Dia- 
mond (1996, 217) raises the question of whether an individual account 
system “is desirable, because compulsory savings are less attractive when 
costs are eating up a large fraction” of the savings. 
In this paper, we investigate these issues. In section 2.1, we look at how 
various defined-contribution plans are administered around the world. In 
section 2.2, we  focus on the cost of administering these plans. In section 
2.3, we  lay out a possible administrative structure for implementing an 
efficient individual accounts program in the United States and make some 
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ballpark estimates for the cost of such a system. Finally, we  address the 
issue  of  whether the  administrative-structure  and  cost  issues are suffi- 
ciently daunting to preclude further consideration of partial privatization 
of social security in the United States. 
2.1  Administering Individual Account Plans 
Defined-contribution  (DC)  plans  have  been  popular  as  employer- 
sponsored plans in the United States for years. They have become increas- 
ingly prevalent here and elsewhere around the world over the last few de- 
cades. In recent years, DC plans have also become a popular vehicle for 
reforming national retirement systems. We first look at how DC plans have 
been  organized in  three countries as part of their nationally mandated 
retirement-income-security systems. Then we  look at how DC plans are 
organized in the United States as part of our employer-based retirement 
system. The purpose of this survey is to explore what is feasible by examin- 
ing what is already in place in various countries, including our own. 
Chile is often considered to be the preeminent example of a country 
that moved from a defined-benefit (DB) retirement system to a mandated 
retirement-saving program. Since 198 1, all covered Chilean workers have 
been required to contribute 10 percent of their monthly earnings to a sav- 
ings account for retirement purposes. These contributions must  be  in- 
vested through a highly regulated set of intermediaries known as udmin- 
istrudorus de fondos depensiones (AFPs). Workers can choose which of the 
AFPs they want to use for investments, but they can invest through only 
one at a time. Each of the AFPs can manage only one retirement portfolio, 
and there is a strict separation required between that fund and others of- 
fered by the management firm. The AFP allocates the returns on the invest- 
ment funds to the individual accounts. At retirement, workers can choose 
either to buy an annuity or to take periodic distributions designed to last 
a lifetime. In addition to the retirement benefits, the AFPs also provide a 
system of  survivors and disability benefits. These latter benefits and the 
administrative costs of the system are financed by an additional contribu- 
tion of 3 percent of pay (Edwards 1998). 
Australia has traditionally had a means-tested old-age pension system 
that provides a flat benefit to the elderly. The level of benefits is approxi- 
mately 25 percent of average weekly wages. During the 1980s, concerns 
arose about the cost of Australia’s old-age pension system owing to the 
high rate of qualification for benefits. Fully 81 percent of the elderly were 
qualifying for some benefits under the program, and two-thirds qualified 
for full benefits. Australia has a baby boom generation similar in relative 
size to that in the United States. The prospect of Australia’s baby boomers 
approaching retirement age sparked an interest in finding an alternative 
means of  providing retirement-income security in the future. Today, ap- A Cost-Effective National Program of Personal Security Accounts  43 
proximately 15 percent of the population of Australia is over age sixty- 
five, and this segment of the population is expected to grow to 23 percent 
by 2030. While the evolving demographics of the society posed a problem 
for the finances of the old-age pension system, at the same time there was 
a concern that only 40 percent of the workforce were covered by voluntary 
employer-sponsored superannuation systems. 
The government had stuck its toe in the water of a mandated savings 
plan in the mid-1980s as part of a mandatory wage-negotiation process 
between employers and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). 
The ACTU was negotiating for a 6 percent general wage increase in 1986. 
The government  was concerned about the potential inflationary  conse- 
quences of such a wage increase and managed to strike a compromise with 
the ACTU. It granted  a  3 percent  wage  increase but  prevailed on the 
unions to accept the remaining 3 percent as a contribution to retirement 
funds for workers. As a result of this agreement, contributions to individ- 
ual accounts were gradually introduced into wage contracts as they were 
renegotiated.  The payments went into existing superannuation funds or 
into  newly  created  union  funds  that  were  managed  by  private  asset- 
management firms. 
In 1991, the Australian government announced that it intended to ex- 
pand this initial program of mandated retirement saving. The Superannu- 
ation Guarantee Charge Act of  1992 was adopted and implemented  in 
July 1992. The act required employers to contribute to complying super- 
annuation funds a specified percentage of earnings on behalf of employ- 
ees. The initial contribution rate was 3 percent of pay. In 1997 and 1998, 
the required contribution was 6 percent of pay and, in 1999, 7 percent. In 
2001, it will be set at 8 percent and, in 2003 and after, at 9 percent of 
pay. One of the intended benefits of the new system has already begun to 
materialize. Workers’ reliance on the state for retirement security appears 
to have declined sharply as the system has been implemented. The Re- 
search Unit of the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia es- 
timates that voluntary contributions made on top of mandated contri- 
butions  equal  an average  of  4  percent  for  all  employees  covered  by 
compulsory superannuation. This second pillar of the retirement  system 
(the mandated pensions) will not eliminate the first pillar of the system 
(the old-age pension program) for workers who fare badly in the labor 
market throughout much of their career but should eliminate the depen- 
dence on it over time for the majority of workers. 
There are several types of superannuation  funds offered through the 
second pillar of Australia’s retirement system. They include corporate or 
enterprise funds provided by single employers or groups of firms that band 
together  for  efficiency  purposes.  There  has  been  a  decline  in  such 
employer-based plans in recent years with a growth in industry funds or 
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and employee organizations. These were developed primarily in response 
to the establishment of the original 3 percent contribution agreements that 
got the whole ball rolling in the mid-1980s. From the outset, the industry 
funds followed a policy of contracting out all services-that  is, adminis- 
tration, provision of death and disability coverage, and, most important, 
investment services. The trusteeship of  the industry funds was from an 
early stage shared between equal numbers of employee (union) and em- 
ployer representatives, with an independent chairman. Some plans for in- 
dividuals and small firms are invested through retail funds offered princi- 
pally by  the large financial institutions. These accounts can come in the 
form of master trusts, personal superannuation products, rollover prod- 
ucts, and allocated pension and annuity products. Another class of funds, 
known as excluded funds, is used mainly by  individuals or family groups 
of one to four members. Recently, these funds have witnessed rapid growth 
because of tax incentives favoring their establishment. Finally, this line of 
funds includes superannuation products offered directly by life insurance 
companies and banks. For workers in the public sector, public plans estab- 
lished by  federal,  state, and local  governments  provide coverage. Like 
many similar plans worldwide, these are largely unfunded. The distribu- 
tion of assets and the number of plans within each specific category are 
shown in table 2.1. 
The whole mandated  second-tier  retirement system in  Australia  has 
been organized to take advantage of the structure of financial institutions 
and retirement systems already in place. Other than the funds that are of- 
fered to individuals, virtually all the investment of the superannuation ac- 
counts now takes place in an environment of pooled funds. The Australian 
Prudential  Regulatory Authority (APRA) estimated that, in June  1998, 
the asset allocation in superannuation funds was 7 percent in cash and de- 
posits, 28 percent in fixed-income holdings, 37 percent in equities, 8 per- 
cent in direct properties, and 16 percent in international funds. 
The United Kingdom has a two-tier public retirement system with vol- 
untary employer-sponsored pensions as the third tier. The first tier of the 
U.K. system is the basic state pension, a floor old-age benefit that retirees 
qualify to receive on the basis of the length of their career. The second tier 
of the U.K. system is  called the supplemental earnings-related  pension 
scheme (SERPS). The government allows workers to opt out of this sec- 
ond tier of the system, and about 83 percent do so. Workers are required 
to use employer-based pensions or personal pensions if  they opt out of 
the state-provided system. The SERPS program establishes the minimum 
benefits or contributions that must be provided for/by workers who opt 
out of the state program. For the most part, workers who contract out of 
SERPS are required to annuitize their accumulation at retirement (Budd 
and Campbell 1998). 
In the United  Kingdom,  about two-thirds of  the workers who have Table 2.1  Profile of Australian Superannuation Funds as of 31 December 1997 
Total Assets,  Total Number of Funds,  Number of Accounts, 
December 1997  June 1997  December 1997 
$Billions  Distribution  Distribution  Distribution 
(Australian)  (”/.I  Number  (“w  Millions  (Yo) 
Corporate  64.7  20.5  4,277  3.38  1.4  8.0 
Industry  21.5  6.7  116  0.08  5.5  30.9 
Public sector  74.6  23.6  122  0.09  2.8  16.0 
Retail  79.9  24.4  319  0.31  7.8  43.4 
“Excluded”  38.4  11.7  157,084  96.14  0.3  1.7 
Balance of statutory funds  46.6  13.1  N.A.  N.A. 
Total  325.7  100.0  161,918  100.00  17.7  100.0 
Source  Insurance and Superunnuation Cornmission Bulletin (Australian Insurance and Superannuation Commission), December 1998, 30 
Note  NA = not available 46  Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shoven 
contracted  out of  SERPS are covered by  occupation pension programs 
run by  employers, and the  remainder are covered by  personal  pension 
plans. The personal plans are DC plans. All the employer-based plans had 
to be DB plans until legislation adopted in 1986 allowed those in occu- 
pation plans to be covered by  a DC plan. Employer plans in the United 
Kingdom  are going the  same route today  as their counterparts in the 
United States; namely, they are shifting to DC plans. Larger plans are 
typically self-administered, with the assets being managed by the plan it- 
self or through insurance companies. Smaller plans are typically insured. 
Personal pension investment can be handled through a wide range of pro- 
viders, including insurance companies, building societies, unit trusts, and 
other financial organizations. There are few restrictions on how the assets 
in the plans can be invested (Budd and Campbell 1998). 
Sweden has recently adopted a set of sweeping reforms to its national 
retirement system that, when fully phased in, will provide retirement bene- 
fits purely from a DC environment. Their old plan was a pay-as-you-go 
DB plan. People born in 1937 and earlier will receive their pension under 
the old system. For those born between 1938 and 1953, part of the retire- 
ment benefit will be based on the old system and part on the new. Those 
born in  1954 and later will receive benefits purely under the new system. 
Sweden’s revised retirement system requires contributions of 18.5 per- 
cent of  pay on earnings up to $37,000 per year. Of  that,  16 percentage 
points are used to finance current benefit payments to retirees. The extra 
2.5 percentage points  are contributed  to a “premium reserve account.” 
Workers’ contributions under the pay-as-you-go element of the new sys- 
tem are credited to individual accounts on the basis of  each individual 
worker’s earnings level and taxes paid. The account is also credited with 
an interest accrual each year that is equal to the rate of growth of incomes 
in the economy. Since the contribution is actually spent to finance current 
benefits, these accounts are phantom or “notional” accounts in that they 
do not hold real investments. At retirement, a worker’s individual account 
will be converted to an indexed annuity. The index is the average income 
growth in the economy. The size of the initial annuity will be based on the 
life expectancy of the birth cohort to which the worker belongs and his or 
her age at retirement.’ 
Under the Swedish reforms, the worker can choose an investment man- 
ager for his or her premium reserve account. Under this system, capital 
management is to take place through  independent  fund managers. The 
Premium Pension Authority (PPA) is to be a unitholder in the funds where 
the assets are invested, but it is  the individual worker who chooses the 
investment manager and how to invest the money. The assets can be in- 
1.  The  Swedish  reforms  are  described  at  http://www.pension.gov.se/in%20English/ 
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vested in domestic securities funds or in foreign funds managed by  fund 
managers with the right to do business in Sweden according to the Swed- 
ish Mutual Funds Act. A national fund company is also being set up to 
manage funds where the worker does not make an active choice of fund 
manager. This will  be  a special fund of the National  Swedish Pension 
Fund and will be managed by a newly established fund board. 
The PPA will  approve the fund managers that can offer management 
services. Approval will require agreeing to cooperate with the PPA on set- 
ting up mechanisms for transmitting information and funds between the 
manager and the PPA. The PPA will also place a cap on the price of man- 
agement services. The managers will be expected to adapt to the technical 
solutions adopted by  the PPA regarding communications and the trans- 
mission of information on participants, funds, and so forth. The fund 
managers will be required to provide brochures explaining the funds to 
investors periodically and to make such information available to potential 
investors on request. There are to be no withdrawal charges for taking 
periodic distributions from the funds on retirement. Each year, the fund 
managers are to provide the PPA with a report on all costs associated with 
the fund’s management. These reports from all the funds will be summa- 
rized by  the PPA and made available to the public annually. It is antici- 
pated that all the approved plans will be managed on an indexed basis.* 
Until the early 1980s, the assets in employer-sponsored DC plans in the 
United States typically were held in pooled trusts, and each participant in 
the plan was credited with his or her vested pro rata share of the pool. 
During this era, the vesting periods could last as long as ten years. Because 
of  this lengthy vesting period, significant amounts of the money in the 
plans at any point in time were not yet the property of the individuals to 
whom they had been credited. Today, employee contributions to 401(k) 
plans, according to law, vest immediately; 90 percent of  the plans vest 
some part of  the employer contribution within one year; and a significant 
majority have full vesting within five years of service. This change in “own- 
ership” of the assets in the plan has been accompanied by a change in the 
management of the assets as well. With the evolution of 401(k) plans dur- 
ing the 198Os, sponsors of DC plans increasingly offered participants the 
opportunity to direct the investment of their retirement accounts. Today, 
virtually all participants in 401(k) plans have some discretion in the invest- 
ment of the assets in their accounts. 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is the major 
piece of legislation regulating employer-sponsored retirement plans in the 
United States. It requires that fiduciaries of benefit plans discharge their 
investment responsibilities prudently, including diversifying plan invest- 
2. The  operation  of  the  PPA  is described  at http://www.pension.gov.se/in%20EnglisN 
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ments to minimize the risk of large losses. If  these duties are breached, 
the fiduciary is  liable to the plan for losses. ERISA, however, includes 
an exception to this provision in section 404(c), which states that, where 
participants can direct their own investments, the plan fiduciaries are not 
liable for any loss or breach that results from the participant’s exercise of 
control. In the late summer of  1987, the Department of  Labor released 
preliminary regulations under section 404(c) detailing rules under which 
employers could hand off some of the fiduciary obligations for managing 
DC-plan assets. 
The precipitous decline in U.S. stock prices during October 1987 raised 
a number of fiduciary issues for plan sponsors still managing their DC- 
plan portfolios. For example, many plans at that time calculated the value 
of distributions on the basis of the last valuation date of assets in the plan 
prior to a worker’s termination. Many valuations were done on a quarterly 
basis. Plans whose valuation dates coincided with the end of a calendar 
quarter were  in the position of paying individuals who terminated prior 
to the end of  1987 considerably more than the value of their account at 
the date of termination. Paying someone terminating on 3 1 October 1987 
the value of his or her account on the basis of a 30 September 1987 valua- 
tion would further drain the value of  the remaining portfolio for those 
workers who remained in the plan. Thus, in addition to the restructuring 
of retirement plans and the changing perception about ownership of plan 
assets, there were practical developments that encouraged plan sponsors 
to allow participants to direct their own investments. 
The section 404(c) regulations were finalized by  the Department of La- 
bor in September 1992 and were somewhat less onerous than the proposed 
regulations had been. Section 404(c) requires that a plan allow partici- 
pants to “exercise independent control” over the assets in their individual 
accounts. This means that the participant must be able to give investment 
instructions to a plan fiduciary, who must generally comply with them. 
In addition, the regulations require that  sufficient information  to make 
informed investment decisions be made available to participants in these 
plans. The regulations allow plans to restrict the frequency with which 
investment changes may be made but require that participants be able to 
give investment instructions with a frequency that is appropriate for the 
expected market volatility of the investment. The regulations outline gen- 
eral rules requiring that the available investment alternatives be sufficient 
to give the participant a reasonable opportunity materially to affect both 
the potential return on assets in his or her account and the degree of risk 
of the portfolio. The regulations require that the participants be able to 
choose from at least three investment alternatives. This diversification re- 
quirement means that an employer’s own securities cannot be one of the 
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but, once a plan sponsor has provided three diversified options, the plan 
sponsor’s own securities can be offered as an added option. Of the three 
required choices to meet the standard, each has to have materially differ- 
ent risk and return characteristics. Overall, the participant must be able 
to minimize risk through diversification across the investment choices of- 
fered. In return for setting up the 404(c) plan, the sponsor is not liable to 
participants for any loss or breach of fiduciary responsibility that results 
from the participant’s exercise of control. 
The evolution of this system in recent years has resulted in the typical 
plan participant being offered at least five to eight investment options into 
which  savings can be directed. These would typically include a money 
market fund, a bond fund, a general equity index fund, and, possibly, a 
couple of more-segmented equity funds, often including an international 
equity  fund.  Most  workers  allocate  their  contributions  and  balances 
across more than one of the funds offered to them. Under most of these 
plans today, workers can check the balances and reallocate contributions 
and balances on a daily basis using automated voice-response systems. 
Those not offering such high-technology capabilities typically allow work- 
ers to reallocate balances either monthly or quarterly and give correspond- 
ing statements of accumulated funds. 
2.2  The Cost of Administering Individual Account Systems 
The prevalence of  individual account retirement  systems of  various 
types around the world and in the United States makes it difficult to argue 
that we  could not organize an individual accounts-based  social security 
reform in this country. A second objection to this type of social security 
reform is that, even if we  could devise a system to administer individual 
accounts, the costs associated with running such a system would absorb 
much of the added efficiency that would result from the reform itself. 
Peter Diamond (1 996, 21 5-1 6) estimates that, in 199  1,  Chile’s per capita 
administrative costs for its national retirement system were 2.5-12.5  times 
those of the US. social security system. This follows from an estimate that 
the U.S. system costs were an average of $18.70 per person and that Chile’s 
were $89.10. The 2.5-12.5  times ratios come from a rough estimate of the 
costs applied across contribution or account balances that would be held 
by  workers with low versus high earnings rates. While the difference in 
costs in  the two  systems is notable, on its own  Diamond’s observation 
does not tell us much. Certainly, the inference with which he leaves us is 
that Chile’s  system is  quite inefficient. On the other hand, he  does not 
compare the rates of return in the two systems. Nor does he consider the 
possibility that social security in the United States is being administered 
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levels of service from its administrators. Certainly, the latter is a prospect 
that Robert J.  Myers (1992, 16), the former chief actuary of the system, 
has raised. 
Sebastian Edwards (1998,45) estimates that, in  1983, Chile’s costs were 
about 15 percent of total accumulated balances at the time. But, by  1993, 
they had dropped to 1.8 percent of total assets. While the earlier figure is 
clearly not one that anyone would want to see sustained in a retirement 
system, it was drawn from the start-up period of Chile’s individual ac- 
counts system. A system such as Chile’s has a significant component of 
fixed costs. Such costs would generally be significantly higher relative to 
assets during the start-up phase than they would be once the system ma- 
tured. Olivia Mitchell (1993, 409) observes that, by  the early 1990s, the 
cost of the private account system in Chile on an active contributor basis 
was about the equivalent of the cost of its public social security system 
still in operation. On a total contributor basis, the private account system 
was only about two-thirds as expensive as the public system. So the private 
systems are not  necessarily more expensive than public DB programs, 
even in Chile. 
Even though Mitchell’s observations about the relative costs of Chile’s 
public social security system and its individual accounts system suggest 
that the latter is  not necessarily less efficient, the prospect of a system 
costing 1.8 percent of total assets per year is not very  reassuring. In his 
work on the cost of the Chilean system, Peter Diamond (1996, 216-17) 
points to the marketing costs associated with a system targeted at individ- 
ual investors as possibly  being  responsible for the high  administrative 
costs. He notes, for example, that, in the United States, the costs of mutual 
funds directed toward individuals are about three times those directed to- 
ward groups and those handling large accounts. Citing research on the 
relative costs of the Chilean and Australian systems, he notes that nearly 
36 percent of the costs of the Chilean AFPs are attributed to marketing, 
compared to between 3.2 and 6.4 percent of the Australian funds’ costs. 
Other than the funds that are offered directly to individuals in Australia, 
virtually all the investment of  the Australian  superannuation  accounts 
now takes place in an environment of pooled funds. Certainly, compared 
to Chile, Australia appears to have a cost-effective system of retirement 
funding based on the twin elements of mandating contributions and a 
large number of superannuation accounts being offered on a group basis 
through  industry  funds. The Association  of  Superannuation Funds of 
Australia (“Administration Costs $4.40” 1998) estimates that the average 
administrative costs of their system equal $4.40-that  is, U.S. $2.85-per 
member per week. In U.S. currency terms, at this rate administrative costs 
for a system that held average balances of $1,000 would be nearly 15 per- 
cent of assets per year. For a system that held average balances of $5,000, 
the cost would drop to 3 percent per year. For one that held average bal- A Cost-Effective National Program of Personal Security Accounts  51 
Table 2.2  Administrative Costs as a Percentage of Assets under Management in 
Australian Individual Account Superannuation Funds  during 1996 
and 1997 




10,000 or more 
Total 
2,500-9,999 
,689  ,619 
,849  ,673 
303  ,797 
,854  ,837 
,922  ,846 
,900  335 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Belconnen, Australian Capital Territory, tabulations 
of a joint quarterly survey conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Austra- 
lian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
ances of $10,000, administrative costs would be 1.5 percent per year. By 
the time average account balances got to be $30,000, administrative costs 
would be under 0.5 percent per year. This pattern is important because it 
reflects the pattern of accumulating balances in a retirement system like 
Australia’s as it is being phased in, as Australia’s is now. 
The costs of the system as a percentage of accumulated funds should 
be falling with the growth in the funds over the implementation period, as 
they clearly did in Chile. The administrative costs stated as a percentage 
of funds under management in Australia’s individual account system for 
1996 and 1997 are shown in table 2.2. The expenses reported here include 
those associated with the administration of the accounts and the invest- 
ment of the assets and other expenses related to running the system. It is 
somewhat surprising that smaller plans report lower expense rates than do 
larger plans. This may possibly reflect differences in communications or 
other services provided to participants in larger plans. 
Two  asides about the Australian  system should be mentioned.  First, 
there has been  a growing interest in  allowing workers somewhat more 
choice in the system than they have at the present time. So far, the discus- 
sion has focused more on choices of vendors than on choices of alternative 
segments of the financial market, similar to what American 401(k) partici- 
pants typically enjoy. Second, the tax treatment of mandated superannua- 
tion savings in Australia is punitive. Contributions are made with posttax 
earnings. Earnings on the funds are taxed at the point at which they are 
earned. Finally, benefits are taxed when received. No plan for the US. pen- 
sion or social security system of which we  are aware involves such heavy 
taxation. There are no comparable cost data, at least any of which we  are 
aware, on the administration of retirement plans in the United Kingdom. 
One of the problems with the U.K. system that has received widespread 
attention is the so-called misselling scandal. From the establishment of the 
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ond tier of the national retirement program. Originally, however, the only 
way  to contract out of the SERPS was to be an active participant in an 
“occupation” retirement plan-that  is, an employer- or union-sponsored 
plan. In 1988, the government allowed contracting out into personal pen- 
sion plans. A number of life insurance companies began selling what are 
called rebate only pensions and other insurance products to set these up. 
The rebate only plans accept only the government’s national  insurance 
rebates given to fund the benefits of those contracting out of the SERPS. 
They will not take any additional contributions. 
Insurance agents began selling these products in the late 1980s and early 
1990s as an attractive alternative to the SERPS and to occupation plans 
where workers had previously contracted out of SERPS. By  1994, there 
was  a government investigation of  these personal plans (Securities and 
Investment Board 1994), which concluded that as many as 300,000 work- 
ers had been bid out of  their occupation plans and had suffered losses 
because of bad financial advice, advice that was not in compliance with 
the Financial Services Act regulatory standards. Claims in the billions of 
pounds were pressed against the companies providing the plans because 
of the poor advice that was provided to workers in making their decision 
as to whether to go with a personal pension (Financial Times, 6 January 
1996). 
More recent analysis of personal plans in the United Kingdom suggests 
that the costs associated with personal pensions are highly variable and 
can potentially erode the full value of returns on investments over time 
(Budden 1997). The United Kingdom has taken a somewhat more laissez- 
faire attitude about regulating the providers of benefits to those who have 
contracted out of the SERPS than Australia has regarding its mandated 
savings program. The introduction of mandated superannuation in Aus- 
tralia in 1992 has resulted in relatively few consumer-protection issues be- 
ing raised by policyholders. Committed to minimizing fraudulent activity 
or inappropriate conduct relating to the growing superannuation savings 
pool, the Australian federal government in 1987 bolstered consumer pro- 
tection associated with this form of long-term saving. The Insurance and 
Superannuation Commission (ISC) was created in 1987 specifically to ad- 
dress some of the government’s concerns about associated sporadic in- 
appropriate  selling  of  superannuation  policies.  Proactive  regulation 
increased after the passage of the legislation establishing the current super- 
annuation framework in Australia. Two of the major consumer issues with 
which the Australian government dealt in the early 1990s were the disclo- 
sure of key features linked with superannuation policies and the regulation 
of the selling practices of intermediaries who distribute such policies. The 
future approach toward disclosure, linked with superannuation, is summa- 
rized in the Australian Treasury (1997) statement that “it is highly desir- 
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instruments be developed. All financial instruments . . . will be subject to 
a requirement to disclose all relevant information to permit investors to 
make informed investment decisions” (p. 4). 
The individual account system in Sweden is just getting organized, and 
no data are available at this time on the administrative costs that will be 
associated with it. Sweden has clearly opted for a system that is more reg- 
ulated than that in the United Kingdom. Given that investments must be 
through index funds provided through licensed managers who must post 
their fees with the regulatory agency, the Swedish system is also going to 
be more regulated than either Australia’s or Chile’s. 
Because the 401(k) system is voluntary in the United States, the regula- 
tory authorities have not paid as much attention to administrative-cost 
reporting as have the corresponding authorities in Australia, which has 
a mandatory system. However, there are cost estimates for U.S.  401(k) 
plans. Access Research estimates that, in mid-1997, asset levels in 401(k) 
plans stood at approximately $865 billion and that the annual administra- 
tive fees for both record keeping and asset management for the year were 
$6.7 billion, or seventy-seven basis points-that  is, 0.77 percent (Wuelfing 
1997). This is similar to the charges levied against the Australian funds, 
which are also organized at the employer level. 
The disclosure of tax-qualified plan operations that the government re- 
quires of plan sponsors requires reporting a range of plan costs, including 
the administrative costs charged to the plan. These do not include the 
asset-management charges. However, pure asset-management charges can 
be extraordinarily low (on the order of 0.01 percent) for indexed invest- 
ment strategies. We  have tabulated the administrative costs reported  on 
the form 5500 tapes for 401(k) plans during 1995. Those results are shown 
in table 2.3. The table shows the mean and median administrative cost as 
a percentage of the average of beginning- and ending-year balances in the 
plans. We eliminated all plans that reported costs in excess of 200 percent 
of plan assets because we  believed that there must be some reporting er- 
rors. We  also eliminated all plans reporting zero administrative costs. In 
some cases, plan sponsors may be picking up the full cost of administering 
these plans, and it made little sense to include these plans in our tabula- 
tions. Finally, we  included only plans that were  at least three years old 
because we did not want to include plans that were still incurring substan- 
tial start-up costs. Including those plans did not radically change the re- 
sults, but we were interested in seeing what plan costs would be in an on- 
going environment. 
From table 2.3, it is clear that there are substantial economies of scale 
related to various  aspects  of  the  administration  of  401(k) plans.  One 
should be  careful in interpreting the costs among smaller plans because 
there were very few of them in the tabulation. In each of the two smallest 
size classes, there were twenty or fewer plans. And, in the size class twenty- 54  Sylvester J.  Schieber and John B. Shoven 
Table 2.3  Administration Fees in 401(k) Plans by Plan Size in 1995 Stated as a 
Percentage of the Total Assets in the Plan 
Employer Subsidizes  Plan Pays All 
Administration  Administration 
























































Source: Tabulations of the Department of Labor’s form 5500 files. 
six to fifty participants, there were fewer than forty in both cases. In addi- 
tion to demonstrating economies of scale in plan administration, the table 
also suggests that there is considerable employer subsidization of the cost 
of running these plans. There are approximately three times as many plans 
where the employer is subsidizing some costs as where all costs are paid 
out of the plan. 
There are some costs embedded in table 2.3 that would not likely occur 
in an individual account program created as an element of social security 
reform. First, we  would not anticipate that the costs associated with pro- 
cessing loans under 401 (k) plans would be relevant in a mandatory-savings 
program. The loan provisions in 401(k)s arise because of the voluntary 
nature of the plans. If  people did not have a way  to get access to their 
money in time of hardship, many would not participate voluntarily. Given 
that we  are talking about a mandatory supplement to social security, this 
issue goes away. The second thing is that the trustee’s fees and the record- 
keeping fees show tremendous economies of scale in other analyses of 
administrative costs associated with 401 (k) plans.  For example, record- 
keeping costs have been shown to drop below ten basis points per year, 
and trustees’ fees have been shown to drop below one basis point for plans 
with as few as two thousand participants (HR Investment Consultants 
1997). If we can devise a relatively efficient way in which to group workers 
into large systems, the costs of these functions can be even lower. Finally, 
the actual fees associated with money management in a national man- 
datory-savings program could be driven almost to zero. If we assume that 
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under management-the  total cost of administering the system could be 
under twenty-five basis points. While this might seem optimistic to some, 
we  note that it is possible to buy retail funds with annual costs at or below 
this level. We  certainly believe that it is possible to devise a mass-scale 
system that  would  at least match  what  individual consumers can  buy 
today. 
One test regarding what fees might be for individual accounts is to look 
at the terms offered on retail products today. Table 2.4 shows six product 
offerings from three of the largest mutual fund companies in the United 
States. The table is not meant to be a comprehensive survey, but it does 
contain a selection of widely available, cost-effective ways in which to par- 
ticipate in financial markets. In all cases, the source of the information in 
the table is the 1998 prospectus of the fund. All the index fund products 
have total expenses under fifty basis points, and two have expenses under 
twenty basis points. Four of  the funds charge small annual fees for ac- 
counts under $10,000. All  have special low minimum initial investment 
amounts for IRAs, with four of them setting the amount at $500 and the 
other two at $1,000. One question that people who doubt the ability of 
the financial services sector to offer cost-effective social security individual 
accounts must answer is why  offerings such as these are available in  the 
IRA marketplace. All these products appear to offer inexpensive ways in 
which the holders of small accounts can participate in diversified portfo- 
lios. It is not clear why  the costs of social security’s individual accounts 
must be higher. 
2.3  An Administrative Structure for Personal Security Accounts 
In this section, we  describe a cost-effective way of administering a sys- 
tem of individual accounts. This is meant, not as a proposal per se, but 
rather  simply as a description of  what elements are required to achieve 
cost effectiveness. The system is structured to give workers considerable 
control over the investment of their retirement funds. In that regard, it is 
different from legislative proposals that would create individual accounts 
but put government managers in charge of  portfolio allocation. Giving 
workers some control over the investment of their assets may be important 
for at least three reasons. First, economic circumstances and tolerance for 
risk vary widely among American households. One size fits all never fits 
most people very well. Second, competitive markets tend to produce more 
efficient combinations  of  services and prices than  do government pro- 
grams. And, third, giving workers control or an active role in the invest- 
ment of their retirement savings is likely to spur more retirement savings 
and more financial education, just as it has done in the 401(k) environ- 
ment. 
There are a number of  issues that must be addressed in  structuring a Table 2.4  Sample of Cost-Effective Mutual Fund Products Available Today 
Annual  Minimum  Minimum 
Total  Initial  Initial IRA 






Schwab Total Bond 
Market Index Fund 
Vanguard Index Trust 
Small Cap 
Vanguard Index Trust 
500 
S&P 500 Index Fund  $10 for assets < $10K  .I9  10,000  500 
Asset allocation with  $12 for assets < $2,500  .I1  2,500  500 
1,000 largest market cap  N.A.  .46  1,000  500 
Lehman Bros. Aggregate  N.A.  .35  1,000  500 
stocks and bonds 
stocks 
Bond Index 
Russell 2000 Index Fund  $10 for assets < $10K  .23  3,000  1,000 
S&P 500 Index Fund  $10 for assets < $10K  .I9  3,000  1,000 
Source: The 1998 prospectus of the fund in question 
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system of self-administered accounts at the national level. One overriding 
issue is whether the administrative system is appended to an existing gov- 
ernment agency (i.e., the Social Security Administration [SSA]) or set up 
as a separate, quasi-government entity, such as the Federal Reserve Board. 
Another possibility would be to administer the program privately with 
government regulation in a manner similar to the way in which the Teach- 
ers Insurance and Annuity Association and College Retirement Equities 
Fund (TIANCREF) functions. 
In the early part  of the discussion about administrative approaches, 
we lay out the considerations, in very broad terms, for going one route or 
the other in resolving the issue of integrated or separate administration. 
Primary among these is the set of goals that should be met in structuring 
an administrative system for a national program of personal security ac- 
counts (PSAs). In addition, there are a number of practical issues that 
must be addressed in devising a system. These include such things as get- 
ting contributions from employers into individual accounts, record keep- 
ing, setting up a structure to allow workers to make investment choices 
and the choice of  an investment manager, communicating the details of 
the program, controlling administrative costs, and the like. In the follow- 
ing discussion, we  develop a  step-by-step description of  a system that 
would address most of these issues. After doing that, we  return to the 
matter of whether the management  of  the system should be integrated 
with existing government agencies or set up independently. 
2.3.1  Issues in Structuring an Administrative System for PSAs 
Social security is a national program, and any program of mandatory 
PSAs would replace some part of the existing system on a national basis. 
To the extent that there would be some remaining element of social secu- 
rity, there would have to be  coordination between the remaining system 
and any new mechanisms that would be put in place. Also, to the extent 
that  there would  continue  to be payroll limits on contributions,  there 
would have to be some centralized clearing of amounts earned and con- 
tributed across an extremely dynamic workforce and employer environ- 
ment. This suggests that some sort of administrative entity would need to 
fill an oversight role. Some people conclude that the SSA should fill that 
role  because  it is  already  administering  a  national  retirement  system. 
While it is possible that the SSA could serve that role, its current activities 
and those for which it would be  responsible in  an individual account, 
retirement-wealth-accumulation system are significantly different. 
One consideration in setting up the administrative structure for a PSA 
system is the extent to which the benefits provided by traditional social 
security and those provided by  the PSA plan are directly intertwined. If 
the reform of social security includes benefit offsets under the current pro- 
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would likely make more sense to have the two systems fully integrated. If 
the reform of social security includes independent or supplementary PSA 
benefits, there is less reason for the administration of the two systems to 
be handled by  the same agency. For now, we  develop the concept of an 
administrative entity that we call PSA Central. The resolution of where it 
resides relative to government will be addressed later. 
There are certain goals that can be stipulated regarding any administra- 
tive system. The first of these is that the system limit the burden on em- 
ployers, especially small ones without sophisticated salary-administration 
systems and the staff to support cumbersome reporting requirements. Sec- 
ond, the system must meet the needs of a diversified public with regard to 
the security of the funds accumulated through the system, simplicity of 
operation, and ownership and control of accumulating wealth to the ex- 
tent appropriate in the context of a nationally mandated retirement sys- 
tem. Third, the administrative structure should be reasonably easy to ex- 
plain and navigate. Fourth, there should be limits on the concentration of 
wealth control in order to minimize the significant pressures to divert the 
system’s assets to uses other than the efficient accumulation and securing 
of retirement income (see Jackson 1999; Romano 1993; Schieber and Sho- 
ven  1999; and World Bank  1994). Fifth, the system should be structured 
so as to keep administrative costs at reasonable levels and to distribute 
them fairly across the participant population. 
The United States can learn from the Australian approach and design 
a system that takes advantage of the significant infrastructure that already 
exists for the collection of retirement contributions both through employ- 
ers and through the SSA. The system could also take advantage of the 
infrastructure that already exists for the investment of retirement contri- 
butions in the financial markets. The system need not be organized to op- 
erate at the level of lowest efficiency of any participant in it. In fact, regu- 
lations could be implemented to require that the  system be  more cost 
effective than some of the more expensive 401(k) offerings in the market- 
place. A reasonable goal would be to give workers control of their retire- 
ment  accumulations in  a regulated environment that  aims for efficient 
management of the assets involved. 
Regardless of whether PSA Central is organized within or outside gov- 
ernment, it is possible to specify its administrative roles and functions in 
the operation of the PSA system. If it is organized within government, it 
might serve as a regulator as well  as an administrator. If it is organized 
outside government, the regulatory function would continue to be fulfilled 
by  a government agency. We  are not addressing the role of the regulatory 
body in the development of the administrative system that is laid out here. 
Throughout the implementation of the system and its continuing opera- 
tions, PSA Central would be responsible for all record keeping associated 
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2.3.2  Depositing Contributions and Allocating 
Them to Individual Accounts 
Today, every employer required to withhold income tax from wages or 
liable for taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions  Act (FICA) 
must file a quarterly tax return using Form 941, unless the wages paid are 
for domestic service or agricultural labor. In the latter case, the tax return 
is filed annually  on Schedule H with the employer’s annual  1040 filing. 
Wage information is reported annually on W-2 forms. FICA returns and 
tax payments on form 941 are due on or before the last day of the month 
after the calendar quarter for which the return is filed. Deposits of accu- 
mulated taxes must be made more frequently. If an employer accumulates 
$100,000 or more of such taxes on wages paid, the taxes must be deposited 
the next banking day. Smaller employers are required  to deposit either 
monthly or every two weeks. The actual requirement for a particular busi- 
ness depends on past tax liabilities. The determination is made by looking 
back over a twelve-month period each 30 June. Employers who reported 
a liability of $50,000 or less can deposit monthly. Those with a past liabil- 
ity of more than $50,000 report every two weeks. 
Following the process that is now used in filing payroll taxes, the quar- 
terly filing of form 941 occurs by 30 April, 31 July, and 31 October in the 
year in which a worker’s earnings are paid and on 31 January in the year 
following wages paid up through 31 December. By mid-January, the SSA 
begins receiving W-2 and W-3 statements from employers. In mid-Feb- 
ruary, it begins processing paper reports. In mid-March, it begins process- 
ing magnetic reports. In April of the year after wages are earned, the SSA 
begins mailing notices back to employers about unverified social security 
numbers  and names. In mid-April,  most of the self-employed file their 
individual tax returns with the IRS. In the May-June  time frame, the SSA 
receives quarterly tax-return data from the IRS and simultaneously sends 
W-2 data to the IRS. The two agencies compare data and begin a reconcili- 
ation process. By  1 July of the year following the year in which wages were 
earned, 98 percent of magnetic reports are fully processed, and workers 
are credited with their past year’s earnings. In the July-August  time frame, 
the IRS sends SSA tapes for posting of  self-employment earnings and 
earnings for domestic workers. By the end of September, 98.5 percent of 
both paper and magnetic reports are fully processed, and most workers 
are credited  with their earnings from the past year. At this juncture,  a 
reconciliation  process of the remaining open cases begins. This process 
stretches out until April of the third year after the year in which an af- 
fected worker’s wages were earned. 
In the start-up phase of a PSA system, payroll contributions would con- 
tinue to be collected the same way they have been in the past. As workers’ 
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mitted to PSA Central. Once PSA Central has the earnings records, it 
would allocate contributions to workers’ accounts. The allocation process 
is  described in  the next  section. Before turning to that,  however, it is 
important to note that, during the initial phase of the system, actual al- 
location of  roughly 98 percent of all workers’ contributions could take 
place within nine months  after the close of  a calendar  year.  For some 
workers, that means that, if contributions made in January of one year are 
not posted until nine months after the close of that year, some contribu- 
tions will not be posted for twenty or more months after they are made. 
In the electronic age in which we  live, that will be unacceptable to many 
workers. 
After getting initial operations up and running, PSA Central could de- 
velop an alternative mechanism for reporting workers’ earnings. Essen- 
tially, any employer willing to file monthly wage-earnings records electron- 
ically would be allowed to do so. Virtually all employers who have DC 
systems are already compiling and filing this information with administra- 
tors of their plans. Many other employers using widely available salary- 
administration  systems could  also provide  this  information  with  little 
effort and small marginal costs. PSA Central would  reconcile monthly 
filings after the end of the year with the complete electronic filings that it 
receives from the SSA as it goes through its normal wage  posting. For 
those workers who have their monthly earnings reported,  PSA Central 
would allocate contributions to their individual accounts on a monthly 
basis. This policy would undoubtedly arouse employee pressure on those 
employers not reporting wages on a monthly basis to do so. Such market- 
based pressure for improved efficiency on the part of employers could be 
beneficial for the economy as a whole. 
For  workers with multiple jobs over  a year whose covered earnings 
reach the maximum level of taxable earnings, their additional contribu- 
tions would be held in a suspense account invested in government bonds. 
As these workers file  their annual tax returns for the year, their excess 
contributions would be returned to them as a tax refund, just as they are 
today. If a worker in this category earns a part of his or her annual wages 
through an employer reporting on a monthly basis and part through an 
employer reporting under current procedures through the SSA, the part 
reported on a monthly basis would be treated as first earnings for alloca- 
tion purposes. The excess from the SSA allocation process would be the 
source of refund to the worker after the end of the tax year. 
2.3.3 
At the outset of a PSA program, as payroll-tax contributions are depos- 
ited with the government, the share that would ultimately be invested in 
individual accounts could be  segregated and invested in a government 
bond account and immediately begin to accrue interest. Allocation of PSA 
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funds into individual accounts could be done at the same time that wage 
records are posted with relatively low  marginal administrative expense. 
The share of the fund representing records that have not been fully recon- 
ciled at any point could remain in the government bond fund as the re- 
mainder of the reconciliation process is completed. As outstanding cases 
are resolved, the fund could be allocated to the appropriate individual 
accounts. 
This process does raise a slight equity issue in that someone who worked 
only in January of a year earning $10,000 would be credited exactly the 
same rate of interest on his or her contributions as someone who worked 
only in  December of the year earning $10,000. The equity issues raised 
because of the inability actually to post wages on a month-to-month basis 
under current operating procedures are relatively trivial relative to a wide 
range of other equity issues that exist in the current system. While this 
situation is not optimal, it is the price to be paid for not imposing new 
administrative burdens on employers not willing to file wage records on a 
monthly basis. 
It would facilitate the implementation of a PSA program and be more 
efficient if  the administrative structure of  the system was evolutionary. 
There could be two major phases to this evolution, with the second one 
proceeding for some substantial period of time. In other words, we do not 
see the evolution as being two discrete steps, with the full evolution of the 
system being completed at the time of the move to the second step. In the 
first phase of the evolution of  the administrative system, PSA Central 
would create a limited set of funds that workers could designate for the 
investment of their contributions under the PSA system. These would be 
structured  to encourage minimal  administrative and investment costs. 
They would also be structured to facilitate workers’ understanding and ef- 
ficient utilization of the system. It  would give those with considerable exper- 
ience in self-directed investment the opportunity to choose among asset 
classes and diversify risk. But it would also offer a limited environment to 
navigate for those without investment experience. 
Consider a system that initially offered six funds: a money market fund, 
a government bond fund, a corporate bond fund, a broad domestic large- 
cap equity index fund, a broad domestic small-cap equity fund, and an 
international equity fund. The Board of Governors of PSA Central would 
put  out a request  for proposals  (RFP) to the investment-management 
community to manage funds in each of  these asset classes. A group of 
managers will be chosen in each category on the basis of their proposed 
investment strategy in a given asset class and on the basis of their charges. 
Some minimum number of managers will be chosen to manage each class 
of assets. Having multiple managers in each area will, over time, encourage 
efficiencies that arise out of competition. Such a policy will also preclude 
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dling one particular class of investments with another. New investment 
managers could be added over time with the periodic solicitation of ven- 
dors that could replace existing vendors if they could offer more efficient 
investment services. 
For the participant in the plan, this mode of operation would allow 
selection across a  broad  range of asset classes but  would  simplify the 
amount of information that would be required actually to direct the invest- 
ment of PSAs. Having multiple vendors would minimize the concentration 
of assets in the hand of any individual investment manager or under the 
direct control of the managers of PSA Central. The investment fees under 
the system should be extremely low because the structure of the system 
would encourage broad ownership of a class of assets and minimal churn- 
ing of particular assets within the class. Record keeping should be quite 
efficient because of the economies of scale that can be realized from a large 
system, as we have shown earlier. 
In the second phase of evolution of PSA Central, individual fund man- 
agers would be able to offer a family of funds to individual workers. Their 
fund offerings would parallel those initially offered by PSA Central. Each 
fund manager in the system would have to offer a full range of funds. Al- 
though many managers would likely manage assets in the full range of as- 
set classes included, some might offer several of the classes and contract 
with other managers to manage the others. Workers would be restricted 
in their ability to shift the management of their funds from the PSA Cen- 
tral group of funds to individual managers on the basis of their account 
balances. The limits on being able to move to individual managers might 
be set at $1,000, $5,000, $10,000, or some other reasonable level. No indi- 
vidual worker would be allowed to have his or her fund invested with more 
than one manager at a time. Fund managers would be chosen to enter the 
system on the basis of an RFP process that would focus on investment 
strategy within each class of funds, security, and fees for asset manage- 
ment. 
It is possible that  some entirely new groups of fund managers might 
arise under this approach, somewhat along the lines of the Australian ex- 
perience. For example, it is likely that organizations like the AFL-CIO, or 
even one of its affiliate members, might organize a set of funds to offer to 
union members or contract with an existing fund-management company 
to do so. Such a fund might actually pursue investment policies that would 
serve its clientele’s preferences-for  example, avoiding investing in anti- 
union companies. The pursuit of such policies would be permitted as long 
as the equity fund  offered  under  this manager was  broadly diversified 
across the total range of assets in the economy and structured to operate 
efficiently. Over time, if  it was deemed desirable, additional funds might 
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to those managers on a pooled basis. All record keeping would still be 
performed through PSA Central. 
For the participant in  the plan,  this mode of operation would  allow 
selection among a broad range of both asset classes and asset managers. 
Not implementing this phase until the system has been operating for a 
couple of years will give workers time to become familiar with the process 
of making their own investment choices. Requiring that workers have a 
minimum balance will also increase the likelihood that workers have had 
some time and experience dealing with choice in the base system. The 
investment fees under the system should remain low because the structure 
of the system would still encourage broad ownership of each class of assets 
and minimal churning of  particular  assets. Record keeping should con- 
tinue to be efficient because it would still be centrally operated. 
2.3.4  Worker Allocation of Funds 
Initial allocation of workers’ assets to particular funds could be accom- 
plished in several ways. After wage records are posted and the initial allo- 
cation  of  funds to individual workers is  accomplished, workers would 
make their individual investment choices. The three media that are used 
for doing this in 401(k) and similar plans are paper-based systems, voice- 
response systems, and Internet systems. It should be possible for the PSA 
plans to use  all three of these media. Information  relevant to workers’ 
choices would be distributed through employers. 
One of the questions that would have to be addressed at the outset is 
how frequently workers would be allowed to reallocate their assets in the 
system. The experience that Watson Wyatt Worldwide’s consultants have 
had in the design, implementation, and administration of DC plans where 
workers direct the investment of the assets in them is that allowing workers 
the option of moving their money across funds on a daily basis actually 
results in fewer asset transfers than does allowing assets to be moved less 
frequently. Initially, the  volume of  work  involved in  start-up  activities 
might preclude the option of allowing workers to move their assets daily. 
Ultimately, however, the value of giving workers true control of the invest- 
ment of  their assets and the fact that they exhibit more stable tendencies 
in  the freer environment suggest that daily allocation is the best way  to 
proceed. 
Another question that must be addressed at the outset is how to invest 
the assets of workers who fail to allocate their own assets in the system. 
This is a policy question that may result in a wide range of answers. The 
point of  this discussion is not to resolve all policy questions associated 
with a PSA system but to illustrate that such an administrative system can 
be  developed that is both effective and cost efficient. The choices would 
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ticular fund, probably the bond index fund, to allocating them on some 
pro rata basis across the range of funds. The latter approach might actu- 
ally alter the pro rata distribution of assets on the basis of the age of the 
worker. This system would seem to accommodate the entire range of op- 
tions or possibilities on an efficient basis. 
2.3.5  Communicating about the System 
During the start-up phase of the system, there would need to be a media 
campaign telling all workers about the implementation of the PSA system. 
Explanatory materials could be provided through all forms of news out- 
lets, employers, the postal  service, banks, churches, and other relevant 
community organizations. The asset-allocation materials would be distrib- 
uted  through  employers. Presumably, the  federal government  has  the 
names and addresses of all employers who are currently contributing pay- 
roll taxes for their workers, so this would seem to be the most direct way 
to get to workers. Indeed, going through employers was the mechanism 
used in 1936 to register workers for the assignment of the original set of 
social security numbers and resulted in significantly higher initial registra- 
tion than had been anticipated (Schieber and Shoven 1999). 
After  the initial phase-in  of  the  program,  PSA  Central would  send 
workers periodic statements of their accounts. These statements would in- 
clude information on contributions in the most recent period, including the 
allocation of contributions by asset class, returns earned in each case, total 
cumulative balances in each class of asset and in total, and rate-of-return 
information for relevant comparison periods. Participants could also gather 
such information through a voice-response system or the Internet. 
As the second phase of the investment options open to workers is intro- 
duced, it is likely that some communications would come from fund man- 
agers offering investment services directly to individual workers. Under 
this phase of operations, when the worker calls with questions regarding 
his or her balances, the call would either go directly to the particular ven- 
dor-call  it Investco-or  be routed there through a call to PSA Central. 
Investco’s service representatives would be plugged into the administra- 
tive-record database at PSA Central and would have access to all PSA 
records being managed by Investco. 
At least once a year, PSA Central would mail participants in the PSA 
system a report on all the investment managers in the system. This report 
would break down the costs of administering the various elements of the 
system that were charged against the assets in the system. This would in- 
clude specific charges related to administration  and record keeping by 
PSA Central, communications costs, and asset-management fees charged 
by  PSA Central for its fund offerings and those of each individual fund 
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Under this structuring of the system, it is likely that asset-management 
fees will continue to be relatively low. Keep in mind that asset managers 
are not  actually acquiring funds directly from individual workers. The 
money  invested in  their  funds would  flow  to them  on a pooled  basis 
through PSA Central. If the individual managers’ fees get to be too high, 
it is likely that workers would revert back to PSA Central. On the other 
hand, workers might be willing to pay somewhat higher management fees 
for using a particular  investment manager because of the services pro- 
vided. It would be possible to limit fund vendors’ fees to such a level that 
the total administrative cost of the system, including all central adminis- 
trative operations, is no more than one hundred basis points or some other 
reasonable level. Our expectation is that most vendors would offer services 
at cost rates well  below such a ceiling. The fund manager would be re- 
quired to report annually all costs associated with the operation of each 
of the funds offered and the returns on the fund. PSA Central would make 
this  information  available  to the  general  public  in  a  summary  form 
through  the news media and the Internet. Investco’s call center would 
handle all queries about account balances, asset allocations, and the like 
for PSA balances being managed by Investco. 
2.3.6  Paying Benefits to Participants 
One of the other policy issues relative to the consideration of  a PSA 
system is how benefits are to be distributed. In the case of retirement ben- 
efits, the issue is  whether workers would be required to annuitize some 
or all of their PSA balance. Once again, the system can be structured to 
give policy makers maximum flexibility in choosing among the options 
available to them. Since PSA Central will have a full accounting of all ac- 
count balances and where they are invested, it would be quite easy as a 
worker retires and begins to claim benefits to sequester a portion of the 
accumulation for the purchase of  an annuity. Indeed, it is possible that 
PSA Central could provide participants in the system with a list of  cur- 
rent annuity vendors and the pricing of their products on an easily com- 
parable basis if  annuities are to be  offered through  private markets. If 
they are offered through the government by  the SSA, the necessary funds 
could be transferred  from the PSA system into an indexed bond port- 
folio. 
2.3.7  Start-up Financing 
Once a system similar to what we have described is up and running, its 
full costs of operations can be borne by the assets in the system. During 
the start-up phase, however, the government could appropriate the funds 
to put the system in place. The need for a system such as this is related to 
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tem will create initial investment costs that can be thought of as national 
financial infrastructure. 
2.3.8  The Location of PSA Central 
Having outlined the functions of  a central clearinghouse and record 
keeper for individual PSA accounts, it seems like a second-order matter 
whether PSA Central becomes an office within the SSA, another govern- 
ment office, or a private, regulated enterprise. Clearly, the details of  any 
particular reform proposal might favor one location over another, but we 
can imagine the system working efficiently given any of the three arrange- 
ments. 
2.3.9  Summary Comments 
We have attempted to show that it is possible to design a system of in- 
dividual accounts, or PSA accounts, that takes advantage of existing tech- 
nology, systems, and approaches to providing retirement benefits. No em- 
ployer would be forced to make payments through any new mechanisms 
or file any reports not already required by  law. Employers could continue 
to file their tax payments and periodic reporting statements exactly as they 
do now. The SSA and the IRS can continue to conduct their processing 
exactly as they do now.  The only point at which changes to the existing 
system would be required is that of allocating funds to specific accounts. 
But that is  going to be required of any individual account system. The 
structure that we  have outlined here should be highly efficient from an 
administrative point of view. In addition to individual account administra- 
tion,  sending money to trustees will  require administrative and control 
mechanisms. But, if  trustees can perform their functions for fractions of 
a basis point for a 401(k) with two thousand participants,  PSA Central 
can certainly do the same for a system covering millions of workers. 
The new internal record keeping of accounts at PSA Central would cre- 
ate some new activities for our national retirement system. But keeping 
the process essentially mechanical should minimize costs. PSA Central 
should be able to buy a record-keeping system almost virtually off  the 
shelf to do the data processing required. 
Under a system such as the one that we have described, employers, in- 
cluding  small  employers,  would  undoubtedly  feel  pressure  from  their 
workers to disclose workers’ wages  on a regular monthly basis. On the 
other hand, electronic reporting of payroll histories is highly desirable be- 
cause it is the most efficient way to report such information. A by-product 
of partially privatizing social security could be a modernization of the way 
in which labor market information  is communicated in this country. A 
system of the sort that we  have described may require more communica- 
tions than the system that we  have now, at least to the extent that some 
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plans. But the distribution of general materials required by the new system 
and the distribution costs should be relatively minuscule compared to the 
overall scope of matters under consideration. The government could de- 
velop financial education programs that it would run periodically on pub- 
lic broadcasting stations and encourage commercial stations to run those 
same programs as well. 
2.4  How Important Are Administrative Costs? 
To  a certain extent, the opponents of individual account solutions to 
social security’s financing problems have focused on administrative costs 
so intensively because this is an area where they perceive the current sys- 
tem has an advantage over the alternatives. The earlier observation (from 
Mitchell 1998) that this is not necessarily so notwithstanding, the current 
U.S. system is administered reasonably efficiently.  But the administrative 
costs of a system are only one consideration in the discussion of the opti- 
mal means of providing retirement security to a broad cross section of 
the population. 
Although the current social security system might be relatively efficient 
to a.dminister,  it has a number of other glaring inefficiencies. For example, 
Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998) estimate that at least a quarter 
of the current payroll tax is required essentially to pay interest on the un- 
funded liability of the system. The practical limits of a system financed on 
a pay-as-you-go basis cannot possibly provide workers a reasonable re- 
turn given a relatively stable workforce and limited wage growth. There 
are those who are calling for the central funding of social security. But we 
have been unable to accomplish that for the last six decades. Even though 
Franklin  Roosevelt was adamant that his social security be funded, re- 
peated congressional action or inaction from the late 1930s through the 
mid- 1950s disassembled his intentions. We  slid into an unfunded pay-as- 
you-go system. Some people would have us believe that the accumulation 
of the trust funds since 1983 represents an increase in national saving, but 
that is highly questionable. At the same time as social security was raking 
up a surplus, the rest of the government was accumulating debt at an even 
faster pace. 
The only way in which we  can improve the lot of future workers under 
our current national retirement system is to raise national saving and be- 
gin to fund the system. We believe that a record of nearly sixty-five years 
of failing to do so under the current system suggests that there must be a 
better way. Central funding is not credible, and people are understandably 
reluctant to pay higher taxes with the promise of central fund saving. But 
individuals would be willing to contribute more to appropriately designed 
individual accounts. The administrative costs of such a system are prob- 
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system, but the productivity benefits of  a better-funded system outweigh 
the added costs. In this paper, we have tried to show that a cost-effective 
individual accounts system can be designed, particularly by piggybacking 
on systems already existing in our economy. 
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Comment  Olivia S. Mitchell 
In policy matters, it is often said that the devil is in the details, and no- 
where is this more true than in the current debate over how to reform the 
U.S. social security system. In their thought-provoking paper, Sylvester 
Schieber and John Shoven provide a substantial service by taking seriously 
some of the administrative details that need to be worked out in order to 
privatize part of the current social security system. They begin by showing 
how  Chile and Australia worked to resolve structural design questions 
associated with individual accounts, and then they go on to show how a 
similar structure might function in the U.S. context. In this effort, they 
raise and address several questions that thoughtful  observers recognize 
must be resolved before selecting a particular reform plan. 
The four key  tasks of a national old-age pension system are to collect 
taxes, to manage the money, to track participants,  and to pay benefits.' 
Architects of a new system must therefore design mechanisms to handle 
each of these four tasks, and international experience shows that countries 
differ dramatically in how they have chosen to handle these tasks. Struc- 
ture in turn affects the costs-and  often the benefits-of  the plan in ques- 
tion. On the tax-collection front, Schieber and Shoven indicate that it has 
proved fairly expensive to collect pension taxes using individual agents, as 
in Chile. By contrast, using a central collection authority (either a govern- 
ment or a uniordemployer model) can drive down collection costs, as in 
Australia and Mexico. On the money-management front, costs appear to 
decline with the size of the asset pool under management and tend to 
fall after a start-up period. Therefore, a low-cost design for an individual 
account plan would probably need to exploit scale economies and offer 
somewhat limited investment options, as in the U.S. Thrift Savings Plan. 
Turning to record keeping, the third function of a pension plan, here, 
too, there are design choices. Tracking participants and their earnings ap- 
pears to be less expensive when done centrally, as in Mexico's new individ- 
ual accounts program, as compared to a system that relies on multiple 
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retirement-saving institutions.* Central record keeping is  also appealing 
given the need to have regulatory oversight for individual account pen- 
sions. A national regulatory regime is now under construction in Britain 
that will  stand in sharp contrast to the very complicated and (for many) 
confusing state of affairs in the United States. Mainly for historical rea- 
sons, the American approach to pension regulation is quite disperse: indi- 
vidual states regulate insurers, the U.S. Department of Labor oversees em- 
ployer pension fiduciary responsibilities, the SEC supervises investment 
matters, and still other agencies (e.g., the IRS, the Pension Benefit Guar- 
anty Corporation) have their own interests and exert additional sway over 
the pension environment. It would be inaccurate to levy on an individual 
accounts program all the costs of a much-needed pension regulatory re- 
form, of course, but the need for systemic overhaul should be kept in mind 
when designing the new system. 
The last and probably key function of an individual accounts pension 
system is  the payment of  benefits. It should be recognized that paying 
pension benefits is not a simple exercise since, in many reform proposals, 
individual account  payouts must  be  integrated with  a continuing pay- 
as-you-go old-age benefit guarantee. This has been true in Australia, as 
Schieber and Shoven note, and it is the case in virtually all the Latin Amer- 
ican nations following the Chilean model for pension ref~rm.~  To the au- 
thors’ credit, they devote serious attention to the underappreciated ques- 
tion of how the benefits are to be paid at retirement, whether they are to 
be accessible as a lump sum, how benefits will vary with years of service, 
benefit portability, and so forth. 
On the payout front again, several choices need to be made, to many of 
which Schieber and Shoven correctly alert us. The annuity issue is, in my 
view,  key.  Some have argued that adverse selection in  private insurance 
markets will rule out individual accounts since people might not be able to 
annuitize their accumulated funds. However, research shows that private 
insurance markets are likely to be able to meet the demand for individu- 
ally purchased annuities and, indeed, even real (inflation-linked)  ann~ities.~ 
Additional evidence is available from the United Kingdom, where infla- 
tion-indexed annuities are required for a portion of old-age pension bene- 
fits. A related point-one  not touched on by virtually any U.S. individual 
account reform plan-is  how disability benefits are to be handled.  For 
instance, if  a worker is  disabled, he will  need  to convert his individual 
account accumulations into a disability annuity, yet little discussion has 
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been conducted about how this is  to take place. If disabled workers are 
left to decide whether they will annuitize their accounts, adverse selection 
might result when those facing shortened life spans take cash-outs and 
leave the remaining disabled group worse OK Examining the extent of this 
problem is an important area for future research that will have to be taken 
into account as reformers continue to shape specific proposals for individ- 
ual accounts. 
One subject that  Schieber and  Shoven mention but  probably under- 
emphasize is the fact that the current social security system needs to incur 
substantial modernization costs-even  if  an individual account system is 
not implemented. For instance, under the current OASDI program, earn- 
ings  and contribution  records  take  one to two  years  to be  reconciled 
within the system, almost  15 percent  of  employers submit cumbersome 
paper rather than electronic records, and it is impossible to have earnings 
sharing between spouses since records are simply not kept this way. New 
institutions are needed to make it possible for employers and employees 
to benefit from the low-cost contribution, reporting, and disclosure mech- 
anisms made possible by technological developments in the twentieth cen- 
tury. Once these new systems are built, the burden of adding investment 
options  to  social  security  would  be  relatively  small  and  potentially 
dwarfed by the expected gains. Therefore, if the deferred-maintenance ac- 
counting were done properly, it is likely that the marginal cost of institut- 
ing individual accounts could be quite modest. 
Meeting this modernization challenge will be expensive, and it is impor- 
tant  to discuss how  to  spread  the  cost of  modernizing social security 
across all the stakeholders-current  retirees, current workers, and those 
in future generations. Most countries adopting individual accounts have 
forced a relatively short period for amortization of these costs, which in 
effect imposes modernization costs on workers at the time a new system is 
put in place. But other financing approaches could be compared, including 
one in which system-upgrade costs would be financed across cohorts other 
than current workers. To  the extent that baby  boomers already bear  a 
substantial  portion of  the transition  costs associated with  the old pay- 
as-you-go system, there may be some support for spreading these costs 
more broadly. 
Social security reform plans are debated by many who focus on the “big 
picture” with macroeconomic, generational, and political concerns. But, 
as noted at the outset, the details matter too, and they matter so much 
that Schieber and Shoven are absolutely correct to draw our attention to 
them. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that design issues may  be 
make-or-break propositions in the public arena. Most would agree that 
adding an individual account pillar to the U.S. old-age system will likely 
increase administrative costs, but it will also provide participants with a 
range of additional services, more opportunity to invest in diversified ac- 72  Discussion Summary for Chapters 1 and 2 
counts, and a greater sense of  ownership than under the current social 
security system, which confronts insolvency and uncertainty. And, as I 
have shown, the current system is in need of upgrading and will require a 
substantial investment to bring it in line with modern standards. Deferring 
the modernization of  the social security system will  inevitably raise the 
political-and  probably the economic-costs  of that modernization. 
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Discussion Summary for Chapters 1 and 2 
Stephen Zeldes noted that the Schieber and Shoven paper seemed to indi- 
cate that administrative costs as a percentage of assets under management 
were increasing in the number of workers per plan for Australian individ- 
ual account superannuation funds but were decreasing in the number of 
workers per plan for U.S. 401(k) plans. Zeldes suggested that perhaps the 
distinction between fixed cost per plan and fixed cost per worker needed to 
be  fleshed out more precisely. That is, if  much of the fixed  cost is  per 
worker cost, then it would not be surprising to find costs as a percentage 
of assets covarying positively with the number of workers per plan; but 
this result would  be  surprising if  the fixed  costs were mainly per plan. 
Zeldes suggested that, if  most of the fixed costs are per worker costs, it is 
important to examine average balances in order to understand  how the 
number of workers per plan will likely affect total plan costs as a percent- 
age of assets. If, for example, average balances increase with plan size in 
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the fixed costs were  per worker fixed costs, this could explain the result 
implied by Schieber and Shoven’s tables. 
John  Shoven  agreed that these dynamics are important  but  also sug- 
gested that different levels of service in Australian as opposed to American 
plans could also be  a driver of differential average costs. Zeldes  com- 
mented that perhaps the most effective measure of average costs in general 
may be cost per worker. 
Fred  Grauer  suggested  that,  in  general,  the  number  of  investment 
choices available in Australia is much broader  than it is  in comparable 
plans in  America.  Estelle  James disagreed, noting  that,  in  the  United 
States, employers have been  increasing options,  whereas, in  Australia, 
there are perhaps only four or five options. Grauer replied that individuals 
in Australia have a significant amount of choice in selecting a plan vendor. 
But Sylvester Schieber supported James’s observation, pointing out that 
individuals who are involved with superannuation plans through an em- 
ployer are constrained in their choice by  the options allowed by  the em- 
ployer, who sponsors the plan. Schieber noted that, although the issue of 
allowing multiple vendors to offer their portfolios to a given plan is cur- 
rently under debate, there has been considerable resistance on the part of 
plan sponsors (e.g., employers) and therefore that choice for the individual 
employee in Australia remains quite limited. 
Peter Diamond raised the point that, in addition to level of costs, one 
should also consider the significance of the way in which costs are charged 
to the individual: front load versus percentage of assets. Diamond noted 
the heavy reliance on front-load charges in the Chilean and Mexican pen- 
sion schemes and cited evidence from a recent Investment Company Insti- 
tute report indicating that a high percentage of U.S. equity mutual funds 
also used front-load fees. Diamond pointed out that Schieber and Shoven 
assumed no-load funds, and he questioned the appropriateness of this as- 
sumption given the evidence and the significant positive and normative 
implications of types of loads. 
Estelle James offered an example of the normative implications of front- 
load charges. She noted that, in the Chilean system, the front loading of 
fees translates into very  different effective annual charges and effective 
reduction of gross returns for individuals entering the system at different 
ages. Those entering the system at an earlier age experience lower effective 
annual charges and deduction from gross returns than do those entering 
the system at a later age. 
James Poterba cautioned against using the assumption that 401(k) plans 
are breaking even when interpreting Schieber and Shoven’s data detailing 
1995 information on administrative fees of 401(k) accounts according to 
plan  size.  Poterba  noted  that  401  (k)  providers  may  undertake  cross- 
subsidization within the mutual fund family. To investigate this possibility, 
he suggested comparing the Schieber and Shoven table to analogous data 74  Discussion Summary for Chapters 1 and 2 
from before 1986. Poterba’s recent research with David Wise indicates that 
this comparison might be of interest because, in the pre-1986 period, there 
were  many fewer large 401(k) accounts than there are today-because, 
before 1986,40l(k)s in general had not been operating for very long. This 
suggests less opportunity for using revenues from the large accounts to 
subsidize. 
John Shoven pointed out that a cross-subsidization type of effect may 
also  arise  if  financial institutions  presume  that  individuals depositing 
money in a 401(k) account may also open up additional accounts. This 
may affect fees on 401(k)s as the institutions attempt to attract and re- 
tain 401(k) money. Poterba suggested that some institutions, for example, 
banks  offering CDs,  actually may  not  want  to accept  retirement-plan 
money because the IRA and 401 (k) rules give individuals significant free- 
dom to move their money around within the account and banks may not 
want to deal with the transaction volume. Sham Mathews of Aetna sug- 
gested that it would be fruitful to discuss this issue with “transfer agents,” 
who provide services to 40 l(k) providers. Mathews suggested that transfer 
agents may have data that would allow one to back into fee and profit 
data for 401(k) providers. 
Regarding churning costs, Andrew Sumwick suggested that a small num- 
ber of individuals would likely  be responsible for most of the churning. 
Michael Graetz replied that the analysis of the Goldberg and Graetz paper 
assumed that individuals were limited as to the number of times they could 
reallocate their funds free of charge. He further noted that, although they 
had only explicitly assumed this for the “simple personal investment fund” 
(SPIF) accounts, it could also easily be built into the “qualified private 
fund” (Q-fund) accounts as well. Martin Feldstein argued that there is no 
particular  reason why  we  would want to regulate how often individuals 
could reallocate funds if they paid the extra cost. Graetz agreed that a cap 
on the amount of  churning is  not necessarily needed, just a charge for 
churning after a certain point. Responding to this point, Samwick cau- 
tioned that this may  lead to paternalistic policies on churning. Getting 
back to Samwick’s original point, Fred Goldberg pointed out that the Gold- 
berg and Graetz cost estimates did assume some level of churning. Sum- 
wick added that he was especially concerned about the different churning 
experience of different populations and that he was pleased to hear (from 
the Grandolini discussion) that Mexico had established a centralized clear- 
inghouse for information, reconciliation, and reporting, which mitigates 
churning  costs. He suggested  that  this was  an encouraging precedent. 
Graetz responded on a related point, noting the crucial distinction be- 
tween the institutions and costs associated with a reformed system on day 
1 and the evolving characteristics of the system over time. He suggested 
that we need not consider the existence of such institutions as a clearing- 
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lation of financial intermediaries) as a precondition for the establishment 
of a system of individual accounts. Rather, institutions such as these may 
well develop over time if the system is established with proper foresight. 
Mark  Warshawsky noted that Goldberg and Graetz assumed a promi- 
nent role for the IRS in their model of a system of individual accounts 
and questioned whether this would be politically viable given the recent 
expression of public dissatisfaction with the IRS. Schieber suggested that 
this should not be a problem, noting that, under the Goldberg and Graetz 
proposal, the IRS would not have access to any information to which it 
did not already have access. Martin Feldstein concurred, pointing out that 
many proposals currently circulating assume some processing role for the 
IRS.  Warshawsky replied that he was referring mostly to public opinion/ 
perception. Michael Graetz countered that he did not see this as an impor- 
tant issue and suggested that the Roth hearings investigating IRS  misdeeds 
had been misleadingly inflammatory. Fred Goldberg noted that, despite the 
complaints about various aspects of the IRS, it performs its information- 
processing tasks remarkably well. 
Picking up a point  from the Grandolini presentation, Leonard  Glynn 
posited  that the World Bank  staff retirement  plan’s experience suggests 
that it is difficult to achieve consistent overperformance from active man- 
agement of pension assets. In particular, he suggested, it implies perhaps 
that any social security system with individual accounts ought to put every 
individual in a “default plan” that would be completely passively man- 
aged, with heavy restrictions on investor choice and ability to reallocate 
funds. (He conceded that perhaps individuals could eventually be allowed 
to opt out into a more flexible plan, but  only after their account  had 
reached  a  specified dollar amount.)  He suggested that  such a  system 
would cut costs from churning and investor education while apparently 
not giving up much in terms of potential gains to active management. 
Fred Goldberg replied that one could take that approach but that it is 
more a question of policy than of mechanics since the Goldberg and Graetz 
framework does allow for a more restrictive default option as well as a less 
restrictive opt-out option.  Olivia Mitchell argued that the investor-edu- 
cation issues do not disappear altogether, as individuals would eventually 
be  eligible to enter an opt-out plan and would need to understand  the 
implications of doing so. Leonard Glynn agreed but noted that this option 
would not be available until the program had been in place for several 
years, during which time investors would have the opportunity to become 
educated about their options. Glynn further noted that annual statements 
could be a part of the education process by including information regard- 
ing the structure of the default plan’s “life-cycle’’ investment allocations. 
This could also have the effect of convincing some individuals to stay with 
the default plan when they are presented with the option to switch. 
Martin Feldstein argued that charging front-load fees was not a viable 76  Discussion Summary for Chapters 1 and 2 
option because the individual would need to pay a new up-front fee every 
time he or she switched investment managers. Consequently, charging fees 
as a percentage of  assets seemed the only viable option. Feldstein also 
commented that it was puzzling that there is not more of an attempt on 
the part of fund managers to offer quantity discounts to clients with larger 
funds. Estelle James replied that mutual fund managers are not allowed to 
offer different fees to different customers. But John Shoven pointed  out 
that this occurs de facto when fund managers offer funds with high mini- 
mum  investments and lower fees than similar funds without  minimum 
investment requirements. 
Kent Smetters noted that Goldberg and Graetz estimated the administra- 
tive costs of their default plan (the SPIF) as between thirty and sixty basis 
points and asked why that figure would not be closer to the eight- to nine- 
basis-point figure of the federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). Estelle James 
pointed out that the initial costs of the SPIF plan would be high because 
of the likely small size of the accounts. She noted that the same had been 
true of the TSP. Fred Goldberg concurred, noting that the thirty- to sixty- 
basis-point figure corresponded to a five-year time horizon, whereas, in 
the long run, the figure ought to be closer to the TSP figure. James sug- 
gested that, with passive management, it ought to be possible to get below 
the thirty- to sixty-basis-point figure within five years. 
David  Cutler noted that many individuals currently do not file tax re- 
turns and that it may be difficult to bring these individuals into an indi- 
vidual account system that relied on the existing IRS infrastructure. Fred 
Goldberg agreed that there are several million individuals who do not file 
tax returns and suggested that an additional form would be necessary for 
these individuals to receive credits to their individual accounts. He noted 
further that any future major tax reform would need to take special ac- 
count of  the implications of  reform to the individual account system if 
that system relied on the IRS infrastructure. Martin Feldstein and Daniel 
Feenberg inquired about the  size of  the working, nonfiling population. 
Goldberg replied that, although it is difficult to determine an exact figure, 
there may be as many as several million such individuals. He cited as an 
example of the type of person falling into this category a young worker 
whose only annual income was a few hundred dollars from a summer job. 
Goldberg also noted that, even if  an individual with official wage income 
does not file a tax return, he or she will still have a W-2 filed for his or her 
work. The system could still credit his or her individual account, although 
with a lag of approximately eighteen months. 